Intelligence
Brief: Ethiopia
By
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
25 October
2005
During the week of October 10, Ethiopia -- the dominant power
center in the Horn of Africa -- moved closer to a political crisis
with the seating of a new parliament elected in a May 2005 vote
that was succeeded by a period of uncompromising conflict between
the government of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and opposition parties,
which contended that Zenawi's Ethiopian People's Revolutionary
Democratic Front (E.P.R.D.F.) had stolen the elections.
Defying pressures
from the U.S. and E.U. -- the two outside power centers with the
greatest influence in Ethiopia -- the largest opposition block,
the four-party Coalition for Unity and Democracy (C.U.D.), which
had recently reconciled its internal divisions and had evolved
into a single party, boycotted the parliament, refusing to take
its seats.
In a quick
response to the boycott, the E.P.R.D.F.-dominated parliament,
having installed Zenawi as prime minister for a third five-year
term, moved to deny elected C.U.D. legislators immunity from criminal
prosecution. In a parallel action in a coordinated campaign, Ethiopia's
National Electoral Board refused to recognize the C.U.D.'s merger
officially, citing a technicality in the coalition's 1994 recognition
request. Zenawi followed by accusing C.U.D. leader Hailu Shawel
of "treason" for engineering the boycott and for threatening
civil disobedience if the E.P.R.D.F. refused to concede to the
opposition's demand for a "national unity government"
that would set up new parliamentary elections.
The C.U.D.
believes that the removal of immunity and Zenawi's rhetoric portend
a severe crackdown on the noncompliant opposition going beyond
the temporary arrests and harassment of opposition leaders and
supporters to which the government has resorted since the May
elections. Zenawi fears that the C.U.D. intends to foment a "Green
Revolution" in Ethiopia along the lines of Georgia's Rose
Revolution, Ukraine's Orange Revolution and Kyrgyzstan's Tulip
Revolution. Although each side denies that its adversary's suspicions
are well founded, both have reasonable grounds to take their fears
seriously.
Ethiopia's
Diversity
The current
political impasse in Ethiopia grows out of the settlement that
was reached in the country after a successful armed insurgency
led by the E.P.R.D.F. overthrew Ethiopia's Marxist Derg regime
in 1991. The E.P.R.D.F. was centered in the Tigray region and
was dominated by members of the Tigrayan minority ethnic group.
In order
to turn its military victory into political power, the E.P.R.D.F.
reorganized Ethiopia into nine regions according to the dominant
ethnic group in each, and gave the regions substantial administrative
autonomy. The federal system allowed the E.P.R.D.F. and its leader
Zenawi to construct a political machine that has dominated Ethiopian
politics for the past 15 years. The machine has enabled the Tigrayan
political class to maintain its power, despite discontent among
larger ethnic groups, particularly the Amhara and Oromi.
The E.P.R.D.F.
survived the test of multi-party parliamentary elections in 2000
that were generally boycotted by opposition groups, which received
only 12 seats. Since then, the regime has faced growing public
discontent, which surfaced in the run-up to and the aftermath
of the 2005 elections.
With a burgeoning
population of more than 77.4 million people that grows at a yearly
rate of 2.4 percent, according to October U.N. estimates, Ethiopia
is Africa's second most populous country after Nigeria. Dwarfing
its neighbors in the Horn of Africa in population and land mass,
Ethiopia is also the major power center in a region that owes
its strategic significance to its proximity to the Arabian Peninsula.
Due to Ethiopia's
regional power, Washington and Brussels operating in tandem have
supported the Zenawi regime with economic aid and military assistance,
and have urged it to democratize. That support, however, has not
been sufficient to save the country from persisting poverty. With
agriculture accounting for 40 percent of G.D.P., 80 percent of
exports and 80 percent of the labor force, Ethiopia has been severely
weakened by drought and depends on food aid that is supplied primarily
by the U.S., with the E.U., Japan and Italy also contributing.
Economic
development has been further inhibited by the failure of Ethiopia
and Eritrea to resolve a border dispute that led to a costly war
from 1998-2000. Persisting tensions between the countries have
discouraged foreign investment and diverted resources to the military
sector. [See: "Intelligence Brief: Eritrea"]
Ethiopia's
persisting economic problems and the Zenawi government's failure
to make credible progress in solving them -- despite generous
foreign aid, which accounts for ten percent of the country's G.D.P.
-- provided an opportunity for a diverse political opposition
to exploit in the May elections. Abandoning boycott for participation,
opposition coalitions presented a clear alternative to the E.P.R.D.F.
Addressing
structural reform in the economy, C.U.D. leader Shawel called
for privatizing Ethiopia's agricultural land, which is currently
owned by the state and allotted to farmers who are not permitted
to buy or sell it. The government responded that the state should
continue to act as a "custodian" in order to prevent
land sales in circumstances of duress, such as drought.
The opposition
also proposed altering Ethiopia's constitution in the direction
of centralization by limiting regional autonomy and especially
by revoking the right of a region to secede from the country.
A more centralized system would favor larger ethnic groups and
is predictably opposed by the E.P.R.D.F.
On the issue
of the conflict with Eritrea, the opposition, attempting to outdo
the E.P.R.D.F.'s nationalism, criticized the Zenawi government
for ceding access to the Red Sea port of Assab after Eritrea gained
independence from Ethiopia in 1993, leaving the latter landlocked.
The May elections
brought significant gains for the opposition, which won 173 of
the 547 parliamentary seats at stake, including a sweep in Ethiopia's
capital Addis Ababa. Although they reported irregularities in
the polling process, international monitors deemed the results
to be acceptable. The donor powers breathed an initial sigh of
relief, expecting the opposition to use its gains as a springboard
to further success by working within the system.
Instead,
the opposition turned intransigent, claiming that the elections
had been stolen, demanding a re-vote, and mounting protest demonstrations
and a strike. The government struck back with force and, on June
8, 28 protesters were killed by police. Since then, E.U. efforts
to mediate the dispute have failed and the adversaries have hardened
their positions, paving the way for the C.U.D. boycott of parliament
and the government's retaliatory measures against it.
Zenawi has
made it clear that he does not intend to permit "a 'Rose
Revolution' or a 'Green Revolution' or any color revolution in
Ethiopia." The opposition is equally insistent in its demand
for a "national unity government," creating a sharply
polarized stand off. At present, Zenawi seems to have the advantage,
but as was shown recently by a similar situation in Kyrgyzstan,
appearances can be deceiving, especially when the opposition is
dominant in the capital city. At the very least, Ethiopia has
entered a period of instability.
The Bottom
Line
The strategic
interests of Ethiopia's donor powers would have been served best
had the opposition acquiesced in the electoral results and had
Zenawi shown signs that he would move democratization forward.
Since neither requisite for stability has been met, Washington
and Brussels are left with a dilemma. If they back either side,
they drive the other into opposition to them. Yet if they do not
enter the fray, they risk chronic instability in a country that
is essential to their strategic purposes in the region. For the
moment, the Washington-Brussels partnership is reduced to calling
for dialogue between the adversaries.
Since the
May elections, the donor powers have continued to provide and
expand aid to the Zenawi government and to criticize it for election
irregularities and suppression of dissent. At the same time, they
have attempted to pressure the opposition to limit the scope and
intensity of its resistance to the regime. Both adversaries have
expressed their dissatisfaction with that response.
Look for
the donor powers to keep playing their waiting game, which favors
Zenawi, until one of the adversaries achieves a clear advantage.
Report Drafted
By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
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